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Lower coverage but stronger unions? Institutional changes 
and union wage premia in central Europe 
Iga Magda1, David Marsden2 and Simone Moriconi3 
This version: February 2015 
Abstract 
In this paper we use the national samples from the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) to 
analyze the evolution of the wage premium of firm- and industry-level agreements in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland (the CE3) around the time of their accession to the EU. We find that 
despite a generalized reduction in union coverage in these countries, the union wage premium after 
accession to the EU became bigger and statistically more significant. This is particularly the case for 
Poland and Hungary, where in the years immediately following EU accession a wage premium associated 
with industry-level agreements emerged which mostly applied to low-income workers ages 30 and older. 
We interpret these findings in terms of the institutional reforms that occurred in the CE3 between 2002 
and 2006. These reforms, which were prompted by the EU Commission’s requirements for EU accession, 
increased the social partners' ability to bargain and enforce wage agreements, and made industry-level 
unions more effective in guaranteeing the protections provided by labor standards. 
Keywords: Institutional change, unions, wages 
JEL: J51, J31, P2 
 
1 Introduction 
The extensive reforms of labor market institutions that occurred in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary 
(the CE3) in preparation for accession to the European Union were widely expected to have a profound 
impact on the organizational strength and bargaining power of trade unions and employer organizations 
in these countries. From the early 1990s onward, the transition to a market economy had paved the way 
for a process of union “revitalization,” which was signaled by the existence of union wage premia in 
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newly established private enterprises (Magda et al., 2012). Starting in the early 2000s, the prospect of 
accession to the EU triggered an extensive set of institutional reforms in the CE3. In its 1995 White 
Paper, the European Commission stated explicitly that the implementation of these reforms was a 
prerequisite for entry into the EU (European Commission 1995). The objective of these reforms was to 
improve the dialogue between the social partners, establishing a role for the government in a tripartite 
concertation mechanism, and enforcing labor standards comparable to those of the existing EU member 
states (EIRO 1998 ). In addition, the participation of CE3 policymakers in the EU's Open Method of 
Coordination in the area of labor market policy was also expected to help these countries reshape their 
national labor market institutions so that they more closely resembled the institutions of the EU15 
member states. As these discussions and exchanges of good practice placed a strong emphasis on the 
involvement in policy-making of unions and employer organizations, it was anticipated that the influence 
and bargaining power of these social partners would be enhanced.  
The effects of these extensive institutional reforms on the structure of wages in the former transition 
economies of central Europe are still largely unknown. Yet this issue appears to be important given the 
declining union density and collective bargaining coverage observed in the majority of new EU member 
states in the early 2000s (European Commission 2010). In this paper, we seek to shed new light on this 
question by analyzing the impact of collective agreements on wages in the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Hungary in 2002 and 2006, two years before and two years after their accession to the EU in 2004. These 
countries are characterized by a model of collective bargaining which lies somewhere between the 
Anglo-Saxon and the western European models. It presents a form of national-level social dialogue 
comprised of worker and employer representative organizations, which deliberate on improvements in 
employment legislation and on the scope for national increases in pay. This system combines firm-level 
and industry-level pay agreements, a national minimum wage, and a labor inspectorate that oversees 
the enforcement of labor rights and employment contracts. Unlike in some western European countries, 
where individual firms may be subject to both industry- and firm-level agreements, (e.g., Italy, France, 
and Germany), in the CE3 model there is no overlap between these two types of agreement, and a large 
share of the workforce is employed in firms not covered by either type of agreement. 
Among the former transition economies, the CE3 are of particular interest for at least two reasons. First, 
they are the earliest reformers among the post-socialist economies of central and eastern Europe, and 
they entered the 2000s with a collective bargaining system that was deemed sufficiently mature to 
implement the reforms required for EU accession. Second, they were the first post-socialist economies 
to join the European Union (in 2004). Thus, we can assume that the experiences of the CE3 provide a 
valid benchmark for future EU accessions. 
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We use data from the 2002 and 2006 waves of the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES), a 
unique cross-sectional linked employer-employee dataset provided by Eurostat. The contemporaneous 
availability of the 2002 and 2006 ESES waves allows us to compare the characteristics of union wage 
premia two years on either side of the EU accession year of 2004. It is reasonable to assume that any 
changes in the structure of the union wage premium which occurred during 2002-2006 were strongly 
associated with major institutional changes linked to the accession.  
With this study, we are contributing to the literature which has analyzed the effect of institutional 
changes on the union wage premium and wage inequality. Existing research has focused on changes in 
western (mostly Anglo-Saxon) economies. Fortin and Lemieux (1997) analyzed the impact of institutional 
decline on the rise in wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s, and showed that these 
de-unionization and minimum wages cuts were responsible for about one-third of the increase in male 
and female wage inequality. Gosling and Machin (1994) and Machin and Manning (1994) analyzed the 
contribution of declining unionization to increasing wage inequality in Britain between 1980 and 1990. 
They showed that the decline in the share of plants with a recognized union accounted for around 15% 
of the rise in earnings inequality during the period. Koeniger et al. (2007) used aggregate data to 
investigate how the change in labor market institutions affected wage inequality in 11 OECD countries 
between 1973 and 1998. They found a consistent reduction in male wage inequality in countries (e.g., 
France) where minimum wages increased and employment protection became stricter, but increased 
inequality in countries (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom) where unions became less 
powerful and minimum wages fell. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to look at the 
effect on the structure of wages in post-socialist economies of institutional changes which have had an 
impact on the power of unions. In particular, our focus on the years 2002 and 2006 allows us to 
concentrate on the wage effects of institutional changes that occurred during the accession of these 
countries to the European Union. 
2. EU accession and the institutional setting of CEE countries 
An essential element of the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy is the development 
of labor market institutions that determine how firms and workers negotiate employment contracts and 
revise employment terms. In the three countries examined in this paper, the transition to a market 
economy occurred in two main stages: the immediate institutional changes that came about after the 
fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, followed by accession to full membership of the European Union in 2004. 
The first stage of the post-1989 transition involved a large-scale shift to privately owned enterprises, and 
the initial establishment of new social partner organizations. In contrast, EU accession involved more 
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far-reaching changes to labor market institutions, in part to bring them into line with the EU 
employment legislation, and in part to adapt them to the European single market. 
2.1. Collective bargaining at the beginning of the 2000s  
Following a sharp decline in the 1990s, union coverage in the CE3 countries was low in the early 2000s. 
At that time, some firms were covered by firm- or industry-level agreements, but the majority were not 
covered at all. Bargaining mostly took place at a single level, and there was very little centralization or 
coordination (Table 1).4 Industry-level agreements played a very minor role in these countries (EIRO, 
2002a,b). To the extent they existed, these agreements generally took the form of multi-employer 
agreements signed by a number of individual employers and the relevant trade unions. These 
agreements lacked mandatory extension mechanisms. Thus, unless they were signed by employers with 
a dominant position in the market, the agreements covered only a small proportion of the sector. 
Furthermore, the weak institutional setting, as well as the low degree of mutual recognition by the social 
partners themselves, impeded the enforcement of industry-level agreements (EIRO 2002a). These 
private-sector agreements were therefore very weak.  
At the beginning of the 2000s, the effective enforcement of firm-level agreements was relatively low as 
well, and there was a great deal of heterogeneity across firms even within the same country. First, as 
employers were not required to enter into such agreements, enterprise-level negotiations were entirely 
voluntary, and reflected a power relationship that mostly favored employers. The collective agreements 
signed during this period were strongly influenced by the rapid expansion of multinational companies 
(MNCs) during the late 1990s. MNCs generally applied to their subsidiaries industrial relations practices 
similar to those applied to the parent company, but they adapted the practices to the local 
socioeconomic environment (Meardi 2007b; Meardi et al. 2009). The strategic use by these MNCs of 
innovative systems of variable pay linked to performance and skills tended to benefit more qualified and 
managerial workers (EIRO 2009a, 2009b, and 2009c; Ost and Weinstein 1999; Aguilera and Dabu 2005; 
Hancké and Kurekova 2008). However, while they had some broad common features, the systems of 
collective bargaining in the CE3 also differed in some important respects at the beginning of the 2000s. 
Collective bargaining in the Czech Republic and Poland was more decentralized than it was in Hungary. 
Union power in these countries was concentrated in newly established firms and reflected the rapid 
expansion of MNCs, as described above (see Magda et al. 2012). The Hungarian model of collective 
bargaining was much closer to the western European model, with the predominance of sector-level 
agreements, a higher degree of union coverage, and better coordination of collective bargaining. 
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Because Hungary embarked on the process of liberalization and restructuring earlier than the other two 
countries, its collective bargaining system underwent a more gradual evolution than the systems in the 
Czech Republic and Poland. For example, in Hungary embryonic systems of social concertation and 
rent-sharing were in place as early as in the 1980s (Zwass 1984; Neumann 1997). This process dates back 
to the introduction of market reforms in the late 1960s, which freed Hungarian firms from some of the 
rigid directives and surveillance associated with central planning in most of the Eastern Bloc. During the 
1980s, liberal rules for the establishment of small firms and cooperatives were introduced in Hungary, 
along with regulations that allowed for foreign direct investment. These liberalization measures resulted 
in waves of spontaneous privatizations, which made Hungary the leader for FDI inflows and new firm 
creation among the CE3 countries during the pre-transition period. 
2.2 Institutional changes after accession to the EU 
By 2002, all three countries in our study had laid the foundations for a modern European system of labor 
market regulation. However, in order to create the conditions required for successful integration into 
the EU and to meet EU employment law standards, they still needed to consolidate this system.  
The years immediately preceding EU accession represented a period of intense change. As we can see in 
Table 1, trade union densities and coverage were decreasing, which reflected general trends observed in 
the majority of EU countries (European Commission, 2010). However, unlike in the western EU 
countries, in the CE3 declining union density and coverage did not necessarily imply a weakening of the 
influence of pay bargaining institutions. Arguably, the strengthening of other parts of the institutional 
framework of pay determination in the CE3 through EU accession has enhanced pay bargaining power in 
these countries. Generally, the reinforced regulatory framework in the CE3 has enabled the employees 
who remained covered to demand wages closer to their objectives. 
In the CE3 countries, the labor codes underwent major overhauls, new obligations under EU directives 
on social affairs were implemented, and the labor market administrations were reformed during this 
period. These changes built on the work of the previous decade, but also represented a significant shift 
in the environment of pay determination. Two areas of change were of particular importance: (i) direct 
actions aimed at strengthening the social partners' ability to bargain, and (ii) various reforms of the labor 
market institutions, which indirectly enhanced the power and the position of unions.  
Among the direct actions taken in preparation for EU accession was a major effort to strengthen the 
organizational infrastructure of the social partners to enable them to engage in the European social 
dialogue and in the procedural regulation of labor markets. These actions represented a substantial 
reinforcement of the institutions for social dialogue and pay determination in the three countries, 
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helping them move from being “transition economies” to being full economic and political participants 
in the EU. These processes continued after EU accession. For instance, shortly after accession, the CE3 
countries implemented the 2002 Directive on Information and Consultation of Employees relating to 
works councils. As works councils were perceived by unions in the CE3 countries as being a "Trojan 
horse" which would compete for the loyalty of their members, the unions initially opposed the 
introduction of these councils. Later on, however, cooperation between works councils and trade unions 
improved in the three countries, as unions found they could work with councils to increase their 
influence and membership (or, rather, attenuate their decline), and trade union members actively 
participated in the councils (Krsgyorgy, Vamos 2001, Kohl 2009). Hungary was again the first of the CE3 
to introduce changes in its national legislation to allow for councils: as early as in 1992 Hungary 
permitted a dual system of employee participation. In the Czech Republic, by contrast, a single-channel 
system guaranteeing employee representation through trade unions—to the extent that unions existed 
in a particular firm—was introduced in late 2001. Thus, the role of these councils remained marginal in 
the Czech Republic. The approach taken in Poland was between these two solutions (Skorupińska 2010). 
Again, although works councils initially played a rather marginal role in the social dialogue setting of the 
CE3, their introduction and development appear to have contributed—albeit indirectly—to the 
empowerment of trade unions. So far, however, there has been little research on this subject (EIRO 
2009). 
As was mentioned above, the accession itself brought about further changes in the social partners' 
duties and levels of policy engagement, even if a strengthening of their role was not directly intended. 
For instance, CE3 countries started to participate in the EU's "Open Method of Coordination" in the 
fields of labor and social policies. Although this involvement did not entail the passage of binding 
legislation, the process of participating in discussions, exchanging good practices, and preparing national 
employment plans required policy-makers in these countries to engage in extensive consultation with 
the social partners about the draft guidelines and their annual assessment by the European Commission. 
Thus, this process indirectly increased trade unions' levels of policy engagement and policy-making 
know-how, and likely improved union bargaining power by reinforcing the procedural legitimacy of 
collective agreements (Garcia et al., 2004). Other changes in the labor market setting are likely to have 
triggered similar developments in unions' ability to negotiate and coordinate. For example, in Poland 
between 2002 and 2006, considerable emphasis was placed on enhancing the power of the labor 
inspectorate, an agency responsible for labor code and pay enforcement, through the participation and 
active engagement of the social partners. The Czech Republic also adopted a new Act on Labor 
Inspection in 2005, and Hungary issued a similar government decree in 2006. Yet even as these reforms 
were being introduced, the general trend of declining union density and collective bargaining coverage 
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continued, driven by changes in the labor market structures and by lower rates of union membership in 
the expanding services sector, in small firms, and among workers with flexible employment contracts 
(European Commission 2010). 
Furthermore, during the study period there were important changes in the laws and enforcement 
mechanisms related to the minimum wage, which is again likely to be reflected in the unions' bargaining 
power. In all three countries the minimum wage is set at the national level, but the social partners take 
part in the negotiations, which raises their policymaking profile. For instance, in Poland a new law on the 
minimum wage came into force in early 2003. This law shifted the power in the negotiations toward the 
social partners (under a tripartite framework) and away from the Minister of Labor, who was previously 
permitted to make a unilateral determination (EIRO 2002c). The enhanced role of the social partners 
may be expected to lead to collective agreements which make minimum wage enforcement more 
effective, by, for example, ensuring that minimum wage regulations are observed for covered workers, 
and facilitating spillover effects (Manning, 2011).5 This is particularly likely for Hungary, where the 
minimum wage rose faster than average earnings between 2002 and 2006, putting pressure on the pay 
of workers in the bottom quintile of the wage distribution (EIRO 2003). While the minimum wage is 
unevenly enforced, it is more likely to be introduced in firms with a union presence that are covered by a 
collective agreement, due to the effective action of unions there. In the Czech Republic, minimum wage 
reforms have been less effective than in Poland and Hungary, as the minimum wage in that country is 
low relative to the median wage, and thus has a smaller effect. Between 2002 and 2006, the minimum 
wage was around 37%-39% of median earnings in the Czech Republic, compared to about 50% in 
Hungary and about 41% in Poland (OECD.Stat). In addition, the impact of the minimum wage appears to 
have been lower in the Czech Republic because of the country’s lower wage dispersion. Conversely, the 
use of extension mechanisms was relatively widespread in the Czech Republic. In fact, the Czech 
government retained the power to mandate an extension throughout the period. Although this power 
was rescinded following a constitutional court decision in 2004, it was clarified and reinstated in the 
amended Collective Bargaining Act of 2005, (EIRO 2004; EIRO 2006). Because it makes the wage benefits 
of collective agreements available to non-covered workers, the greater use of mandatory extension 
mechanisms in the Czech Republic relative to in Hungary or Poland may have in practice provided an 
alternative form of protection of the minimum wage, and attenuated the differences between covered 
and non-covered workers.  
Finally, in the period after the EU accession, the 2003 Working Time Directive was implemented at the 
national levels, again with the engagement of the social partners. The directive required the EU member 
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states to guarantee workers a set of rights relating to, for example, the number of work hours, rest 
periods, and leave periods (Falkner and Treib, 2004). Again, the enforcement of these measures is likely 
to be higher in firms covered by agreements, and to have a positive impact on workers' wages.  
In sum, there has been a substantial reinforcement of the institutions for social dialogue and pay 
determination in the CE3 since these countries joined the EU. It is also likely that accession has had an 
impact on the wages negotiated under collective bargaining; an issue we investigate in the next section.  
3 Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
We use data from The European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) 20026 and 2006 waves, a matched 
employer-employee dataset which includes information on salaries, personnel, jobs, and firm 
characteristics in the manufacturing, construction, and trade and service sectors. For convenience and 
comparability across countries and over time, we excluded from the sample establishments which had 
fewer than 10 employees and were covered by any other type of bargaining agreement, such as 
agreements with individual professional groups that fall within a wide range of economic activities 
(Eurostat, 2003). To reduce the “noise” created by the public sector and its non-market remuneration 
mechanisms, we have chosen to focus on private firms. We have also restricted our analysis to the 
manufacturing sector, as the economic transition in these countries led to the creation of a completely 
new service sector which was generally not covered by unions (Gardawski 2002). In addition, we 
excluded women from the analysis to avoid having to deal with selection issues and unexplained gender 
wage gaps which might bias our results. After these observations were excluded, the sample for the 
Czech Republic included 203,725 observations in 2002 and 349,324 observations in 2006. The sample for 
Hungary was comprised of 27,506 observations in 2002 and 28,689 observations in 2006. Finally, the 
sample for Poland consisted of 94,706 observations in 2004 and 102,298 observations in 2006. We have 
chosen to use as our wage measure a monthly wage definition which considers gross wages in the 
reference month, including bonuses and excluding overtime work. 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for male workers in the manufacturing sector by type of collective 
agreement (industry- or firm-level agreement, or no agreement). The most striking difference between 
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the three countries is in the types of contracts employees had. In 2002, 93% of workers in Hungary, 87% 
of workers in the Czech Republic, and 67% of workers in Poland had a permanent contract. In all three 
countries, the workers who were covered by a collective agreement (either at the firm or the industry 
level) were more likely to have had a permanent contract than the workers who were not covered by an 
agreement. There were also big differences in the composition of the workforce by type of coverage. In 
2002, the firms covered by collective agreements in the Czech Republic and Poland had bigger and older 
workforces, while there were no significant compositional differences between the firms covered by 
firm-level or industry-level agreements. In Hungary, the workers covered by collective agreements, 
particularly at the industry level, tended to be less educated than their counterparts in the Czech 
Republic and Poland. 
Between 2002 and 2006, the workforce composition of the firms in the Czech Republic covered by a 
collective agreement shifted towards prime-age males (both for firm- and industry-level coverage) with 
secondary education (particularly for firm-level agreements). Meanwhile, between 2004 and 2006 there 
was a marked change in the workforce composition of firms in Poland covered by an industry-level 
agreement: i.e., as there was a shift toward workers over age 50, employees of bigger firms, and 
workers with a university degree and a permanent contract. In Hungary in the period 2002-2006, we can 
observe an increase in the share of workers employed by firms with more than 250 employees, workers 
with a secondary or tertiary degree, and employees in managerial positions. This change in workforce 
composition was also relevant for firms covered by collective agreements.  
Finally, it is very interesting to note that during the sample period all of the CE3 experienced declining 
collective bargaining coverage rates, particularly for firm-level agreements. For example, in Poland 
approximately 53% of the workers were covered by firm-level agreements in 2004, but by 2006 this 
share had decreased to 42%. The Czech Republic, which stood out as the country with the highest share 
of workers covered by firm- and industry-level agreements (61.5% and 12.1%, respectively, in 2002), 
experienced the biggest drop in coverage by firm-level agreements; i.e., of 20 percentage points 
between 2002 and 2006. Hungary had the smallest share of workers covered by a firm-level agreement 
in 2002 (36%), and this share declined another seven percentage points between 2002 and 2006. The 
coverage rates by industry-level agreements remained fairly stable in all three countries between 2002 
and 2006. 
Table 3 presents the means and the standard deviations of the log monthly wages in the three countries. 
Columns [1]-[2], [5]-[6], and [9]-[10] show the unadjusted sample moments in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland; while columns [3]-[4], [7]-[8], and [11]-[12] report the moments obtained by 
applying the re-weighting technique by Di Nardo et al. (1996) to re-adjust the distribution of the 
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observed characteristics for each bargaining sector back to the overall distribution.7 In the Czech 
Republic, workers covered by firm-level agreements had higher average wages and less wage variability 
than workers in firms covered by sectoral agreements or with no agreement. In Hungary, firm-level 
agreements were also associated with higher average wages in 2002; whereas in 2006 the highest wages 
were paid to workers covered by industry-level agreements. In Poland in both 2002 and 2006 higher 
wages were paid to workers in firms covered by sectoral agreements. For the Czech Republic, the 
application of the re-weighting technique by Di Nardo et al. (1996) increased the difference between the 
wages paid to workers covered by firm-level agreements and workers not covered by any agreement. 
For Poland and Hungary, the re-weighting technique also increased the difference between the wages 
paid to workers covered by industry-level agreements and workers not covered by an agreement. 
Finally, it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2006 in the Czech Republic, wage growth was similar 
for covered and non-covered workers. Conversely, in Poland and Hungary wage growth for workers 
covered by firm- and industry-level agreements was markedly higher than it was for uncovered workers.  
3.2 Empirical framework 
We assume the following model of earnings for male worker i at establishment j:  
  =	′	
+  +  (1) 
where w
ij
 is the log hourly wage, 	 is a set of individual characteristics (age, age squared, 
education),  	represents the wage premium paid to worker i at workplace j, while εij is a stochastic 
error component. We further assume that the wage premium is explained by the following model:  
  =	 + 		 + ′	 + ′	  (2) 
Where FAj and IAj are two dummies that indicate that the lowest level where bargaining takes place 
is the firm or the industry, respectively. 	 is a set of firm and job characteristics (type of contract, firm 
size, sector). 	 is a vector of the average characteristics of the co-workers; i.e., the workers in the 
same workplace and occupational group as individual i. We assume that due to regularities in the 
recruitment behavior of firms within each broad occupational groups, the workers with higher 
unobserved skills tend to have co-workers with higher average skill levels. In this case, the average 
characteristics of the co-workers (i.e., the average age, the share who have a university degree, the 
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share who are women, and the shares who are under age 30 and over age 55) control for the impact of 
the workers’ unobserved skills on the wage premium (see, e.g., Card and de la Rica (2006)). Substitute 
(2) in (1) to obtain a model for individual wages, which we estimate separately for the years 2002 and 
2006; i.e.:  
  =	Π′	 +	 +  	+  ,					 = 2002, 2006 (3) 
where, for expositional simplicity  ≡ [,, ] collects all of the covariates into a single vector, 
and  ≡ [
, , ] does the same for the corresponding coefficients. Under the assumption that 	 
and 	are uncorrelated with  , OLS estimates of  and from equation (3) describe the causal 
impact of firm-level agreement and sectoral agreements on wages, at time t. The comparison of the 
estimate $%&, '%& with estimated $%(, '%( provides us with insights into the change in the wage 
premium of firm- and industry-level agreements between 2002 and 2006. 
OLS regressions on the average wage level for 2002 and 2006 provide our baseline results, which we 
extend in several directions. We control for the part of the firms’ unobserved heterogeneity which is 
associated with each firm’s age. As Magda et al. (2012) have shown, older cohorts of firms established 
before the transition are generally less productive than newer companies founded in the more recent 
transition period. If these less productive firms which pay lower wages tend to self-select in the 
unionized sector, the estimated impact of firm- and industry-level agreements on wages may be 
attenuated downward.8 
It should also be noted that separate estimates of the wage structures of the model in (3) in 2002 and 
2006 do not allow us to test whether the wage premia of firm- and industry-level agreements were 
statistically different in 2002 and 2006. Thus, we also estimate equation (3) on the combined 2002-2006 
sample for each country and use these estimates to compute the change in the average wage premium 
of firm- and industry-level agreements between 2002 and 2006. In particular, the change in the wage 
premium can be decomposed using the Oaxaca-Blinder technique into a part that is explained by the 
different composition of the wage predictors in 2002 and 2006 (i.e., the endowments), and a part that is 
attributable to the different returns to these predictors (i.e., the coefficients), plus a residual interaction 
term. We then compute the following quantities: 
) %& −) %( = $%(+,,,,%& − ,,,,%(- + +$%& − $%(-,,,,%( + .+,,,,%& − ,,,,%(-+$%& − $%(-/ +	
															+	'%(+,,,%& − ,,,%(- + 0'%& − '%(1,,,%( + 2+,,,%& − ,,,%(-0'%& − '%(13 +	
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																												+	4Π)56 − Π)578957 + Π)570956 − 9571 + :4Π)56 − Π)578 0956 − 9571;.						 (4) 
Equation (4) shows that the estimated differential between the average wages in 2002 and in 2006 (on 
the left-hand side) can be explained in terms of differences in endowments vs. the coefficients of firms 
covered by a firm-level agreement (first line, on the right-hand side), by an industry-level agreement 
(second line) as well as the remaining covariates (third line). If we look at the first line of equation (4), 
which decomposes the 2002-2006 change in the effect of coverage by a firm-level agreement, we can 
see that the first term describes the part of the wage differential explained by differences in the 
characteristics of the workers covered by a firm-level agreement between 2002 and 2006; i.e., the 
expected change in the average wage of workers covered by a firm-level agreement in 2002 if they had 
the same characteristics as workers covered by a collective agreement in 2006. The second term is the 
precise measure of the change in the wage premium of a firm-level agreement, net of the composition 
of characteristics; i.e., the expected change in the average wage of workers covered by a firm-level 
agreement in 2002, if coverage returned the same wage premium as in 2006. The third part is the 
residual; i.e., an interaction term accounting for the fact that differences in endowments and 
coefficients existed simultaneously in 2002 and 2006. The same reasoning can be used to decompose 
the 2002-2006 change in the wage effect of coverage by industry-level agreement, as well as the 
2002-2006 change in the reward from other individual- and firm-level covariates. 
Finally, estimating equation (3) on average wages does not give us any information about the impact of 
collective agreements for different group of workers. The heterogeneous effects of collective 
agreements on wages may reflect differences in union policies or a decision to target specific worker 
categories. Moreover, any change in these effects between 2002 and 2006 is most likely related to a 
change in the distribution of workers’ bargaining power during this period. To tackle these issues, we 
first use quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) to uncover any differences in the effects of 
firm- and industry-level agreements along the conditional wage distribution, and then estimate equation 
(3) for workers belonging to different age groups. 
4 Results 
Table 4 presents the estimates of three different models for individual wages in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland in 2002 (columns [1]-[3]) and in 2006 (columns [4]-[6]) The first model (columns 
[1], [3]) simply includes two dummies for firm-level and industry-level agreements. The second model 
(columns [2], [4]) adds personal characteristics (age, education, job contract) as well as firm 
characteristics (dummies for establishment size and occupation). In the third model (columns [3] and 
[6]) we control for unobserved workers’ abilities by adding the average characteristics of the workers 
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employed in the same firm and occupational group. It should be noted that all of the models are 
estimated by weighted least squares using the sampling weight for each worker as a weight; standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The estimates for the Czech Republic show that there was a wage premium associated with firm-level 
agreements in 2006 only (column [4]). However, this premium disappeared after we accounted for 
individual and co-worker characteristics. Industry-level agreements did not produce a wage premium in 
the Czech Republic in 2002 or in 2006. In Poland, a wage premium associated with firm-level agreements 
emerged in both 2002 and 2006. However, this premium also disappeared in both years after we 
accounted for individual and co-worker characteristics. Interestingly, while we found no significant 
impact of industry-level agreements on wages in 2002, an industry-level wage premium emerged in 
Poland in 2006, which was statistically significant at the 1% level in all three specifications (compare 
Table 4. Columns [4]-[6]). Finally, estimates for Hungary show a wage premium associated with 
firm-level agreements in 2002, which became bigger and more significant in 2006. As in Poland, in 
Hungary evidence of a wage premium associated with industry-level agreements in Hungary in 2002 
disappeared after the inclusion of individual and co-worker characteristics. However, a wage premium 
associated with industry-level agreements which was statistically significant at the 1% level in all three 
specifications was found in Hungary in 2006. 
An obvious issue in the estimates reported in Table 4 is firms’ unobserved heterogeneity. Less 
productive firms, which pay lower wages may self-select in the unionized sector, inducing a downward 
bias in the estimated impact of firm- and industry-level agreements on wages. Magda et al. (2012) 
showed that due to the restructuring of firms during the transition, a great deal of firms’ unobserved 
heterogeneity in CE3 countries can be captured by the age of the firm: older companies established 
before the transition are generally less productive than newer firms founded after the transition. In 
Table 5, we control for the age of the firm (columns [1] and [4]), its interactions with the sectoral 
dummies (columns [2] and [5]), and its interactions with the firm’s size (columns [2] and [6]). Our main 
set of results are unaffected. However, these estimates confirm that there is a selection of older and less 
productive firms with industry-level coverage in the Czech Republic, and with firm-level coverage in 
Poland. After controlling for the attenuation bias imposed by this selection mechanism, a wage premium 
associated with industry-level agreements emerged in the Czech Republic in 2006, and a wage premium 
associated with firm-level agreements emerged in Poland in 2006; both significant at the 10% level. 
Table 4 and Table 5 present separate estimates for each country in 2002 and 2006. In Table 6 we report 
the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the 2002-2006 change in the average wages, after 
we estimate equation (3) on the combined 2002-2006 sample for each country. The estimates predict a 
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significant wage increase between 2002 and 2006 in all three countries, which was driven primarily by 
changing returns to worker and firm characteristics (coefficients). In particular, the decomposition 
reveals increased returns to industry-level agreements as a statistically significant and positive (though 
small in size) contributor to the overall increase in the average wages in Poland and in Hungary. This 
suggests that these two countries experienced a significant increase in the wage premium associated 
with industry-level agreements between 2002 and 2006, net of the composition of characteristics of 
covered workers. Higher returns to firm-level agreements also account for a portion of the total rise in 
the average wage, although the relationship is not statistically significant in any of the countries. The 
results in Table 6 further suggest that changes in the composition of workers characteristics 
(endowments) played minor and mostly insignificant roles. In particular, changes in the composition of 
workers in terms of their coverage by collective agreements did not significantly change the average 
wage, with the exception of Hungary, where the decline in the percentage of employees covered by 
firm-level agreements drove the average wage down (though again, its role was rather small).  
The results in Table 4 do not give us any information about the impact of collective agreements at 
different points of the wage distribution. In order to check whether the results described above hide 
different impact of unions at different points in the wage distribution, we now apply quantile 
regressions. We focus on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution. As in 
the OLS regressions, the sampling weights and the clustering of standard errors are accounted for. Table 
7 reports the results from the regressions based on model 3, including the widest set of control 
dummies. In the Czech Republic, firm-level agreements had no positive impact in 2002, while a weakly 
significant wage premium emerged at the bottom of the wage distribution in 2006. A wage penalty of 
firm-level agreements emerged among the top earners in both 2002 and 2006, which is consistent with 
the idea that unions act to compress the structure of wages (see Bryson, 2007, for a review). The impact 
of industry-level agreements on wages was insignificant in the Czech Republic at all points of the 
earnings distribution, and on the average wages. The results for Poland show that there was a wage 
premium associated with firm-level agreements for workers in the first quintile of the wage distribution 
in 2002, and for workers in the first two quintiles of the distribution in 2006. These estimates also 
confirm that while industry-level agreements did not have any impact on wages in Poland in 2002, in 
2006 there was an industry-level wage premium which applied to workers in the lower half of the wage 
distribution, and was strongest for those at the bottom. Finally, estimates for Hungary suggest that the 
firm-level and sectoral wage premia were mostly concentrated in the lower half of the wage distribution 
in 2002, but that they applied to workers along the entire distribution of wages in 2006. 
Finally Table 8 reports results from estimates of equation (3) for workers under age 30 (columns [1],[4]), 
between ages 30 and 50 (columns [2],[5]), and over age 50 (column [3],[6]). Results for the Czech 
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Republic show a wage premium associated with industry-level agreements for workers under age 30 in 
2002, but which was no longer significant in 2006. Results for Poland show that a wage premium 
associated with both firm- and industry-level agreements appeared in 2006, but only for prime-age and 
older workers. Finally, the estimates for Hungary confirm that there was a wage premium associated 
with firm-level agreements in both 2002 and 2006, and a wage premium associated with industry-level 
agreements in 2006 which were distributed rather uniformly across the age groups.  
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
In the CEE countries, the process of integration into the EU structures continued after the initial set of 
reforms and adjustments, and were strengthened in many areas after the EU accession. Our aim in this 
paper was to investigate whether these processes changed the role and the position of collective 
bargaining among the 2004 accession countries. Based on the evidence for the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland, we found significant changes in the effects of collective agreements on workers’ wages in a 
relatively short period of time; i.e., immediately before and after EU enlargement. 
Our analyses shed light on an interesting phenomenon: although the presence of trade unions 
(measured by their density and collective bargaining coverage) continues to decline, the unions that still 
operate appear to have reinforced and increased their bargaining power, which is reflected in the 
appearance of or increase in wage premia associated with collective agreements. The rising wage premia 
observed primarily in Hungary and Poland (and mostly in the lower part of the wage distribution), and to 
a lesser extent in the Czech Republic, suggest that the unions which were strong enough to maintain 
their position and presence—most likely because of their efficiency, with a benefit for employers as 
well—managed to achieve their goals in terms of wage agreements. We link these changes to the 
developments in the CE3's labor market institutional reforms and developments.  
There was no single policy reform which resulted in a sudden increase in the bargaining power of trade 
unions. Rather, we have identified a series of small steps which together led to a higher degree of 
engagement of the social partners in policy-making, and thus to an improvement of their negotiating 
position (as well as of their negotiating skills). These steps included direct actions aimed at reforming the 
social dialogue (such as the EU working councils directive), as well as various changes in the CE3's labor 
market policy which required active involvement on the part of trade unions. 
Relative to Hungary and Poland, the lack of statistical significance for the effects of collective 
agreements in the Czech Republic may reflect a combination of less effective reforms (e.g., to minimum 
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wages) and the greater use of mandatory extension of agreements, which attenuates the difference 
between covered and non-covered workers.  
Although the firms’ restructuring during the transition allowed us to control for a great deal of firms’ 
unobserved heterogeneity in the CE3 countries, some of our results may be affected by residual 
selection issues. In particular, the selection of bad firms into the unionized sector may attenuate any 
positive effect of unions on wages; however, the existence of a wage premium associated with firm-level 
bargaining at the bottom of the wage distribution seems to be a robust result since the selection of less 
productive firms into the unionized sector in this case would work in the opposite direction. Accordingly, 
our results are likely to underestimate the true effect of firm-level agreements on wages9. 
A number of questions about future institutional developments remain open. On the one hand, 
changing labor market structure and segmentation observed in several of the EU countries are likely to 
undermine the presence of trade unions. On the other hand, further changes could improve the relative 
position of the weaker unions in the CE3. For example, the Czech Republic introduced in 2006 changes 
to its labor code (effective as of 2007) which broadened the scope of issues which may fall under 
collective bargaining agreements (EC 2008).  
Finally, we note that the experiences of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary may shed an 
interesting light on the future developments of the collective bargaining institutions in countries such as 
Albania, or the countries of ex-Yugoslavia. These countries have political histories similar to those of the 
CE3, and have just started (or are about to start) the process of reforming these institutions in 
preparation for gaining EU membership. 
Acknowledgements 
For data access, the authors acknowledge the European Commission, Eurostat, Research Microdata of 
the Structure of Earnings Survey for 2002 and 2006. Eurostat has no responsibility for the results and 
conclusions, which are those of the authors only. 
 
                                                      
9 As we noted previously, this result may be driven by the self-selection of more productive firms under 
firm-level bargaining. However, such a conclusion would be more consistent with a wage premium at 
the top rather than at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
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Table 1: Collective Bargaining Institutions in CE3 Countries, before and after accession to the EU 
 
Czech Republic Poland Hungary 
 
before EU accession after EU accession before EU accession after EU accession before EU accession after EU accession 
Union Coverage 34,9% 33,8% 40% 38% 42% 36% 
Union Density 22% 18% 14% 16% 20% 17% 
characteristics of 
collective bargaining 
uncoordinated; mixed 
firm/ industry level, 
mostly decentralised 
with limited scope for 
industry bargaining 
= 
uncoordinated; 
fragmented at the 
firm level; limited 
scope for industry 
bargaining 
= 
uncoordinated; mixed firm 
industry level, mostly 
decentralised with limited 
scope for industry 
bargaining 
= 
Government 
Intervention in Wage 
Bargaining 
indirect intervention 
e.g. through 
minimum wages 
weak influence e.g. 
through the 
institutional framework 
weak influence e.g. 
through the 
institutional 
framework 
indirect intervention 
e.g. through minimum 
wages 
indirect intervention e.g. 
through minimum wages 
indirect intervention 
e.g. through 
minimum wages 
status and structure of 
work council (WC) 
representation, 
involvement in wage 
negotiations 
WC do not exist 
WC mandated by law, 
information and 
consultation right 
voluntary WC, 
information 
consultation rights 
WC mandated by law, 
rare involvement in 
negotiating 
agreements 
WC mandated by law, 
union-based 
representation, advice on 
economic and social rights, 
no direct involvement in 
wage bargaining 
= 
effective enforcement 
(mutual recognition 
and Social Dialogue) 
low = low medium medium = 
mandatory extension 
mechanisms 
rather limited, in 
some industries only 
no mandatory 
extensions 
rather limited, in 
some industries only 
= 
rather limited, in some 
industries only 
= 
minimum wages 
enforcement 
statutory national, set 
by the government 
with fixed rule 
= 
statutory national, 
set by the 
government without 
fixed rule 
statutory national, set 
by the government 
(fixed rules) after 
tripartite consultations 
(non-binding) 
statutory national, set by 
the government without 
fixed rule 
statutory national, set 
by the government 
after tripartite 
consultations 
(binding) 
Notes: Data drawn from EIRO 2002a, EIRO 2006, ICTWSS Database (2012). The sign "=" indicates that no significant institutional change occurred during the Accession 
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Table 2: Distribution of workers' characteristics by type of collective agreement (part 1)     
 
Czech Republic 
 
Poland 
 
2002 2006 
 
2004 
level of agrement 
coverage: 
all firm industry no all firm industry no 
 
all firm industry no 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
[9] [10] [11] [12] 
Age Distribution 
             
under 30 25.3 24.6 32.5 28.7 25.6 23.5 25.4 33.6 
 
28.6 23.8 26.3 34.2 
30 -39 24.1 24.0 24.3 24.5 27.6 27.4 28.5 27.7 
 
28.7 28.2 29.4 29.3 
40-49 22.9 23.0 20.4 23.0 21.0 21.7 20.6 18.7 
 
25.9 28.7 27.3 22.5 
0ver 50 27.7 28.4 22.8 23.9 25.9 27.5 25.6 20.0 
 
16.9 19.3 17.0 14.0 
Education Distribution 
             
primary 9.6 9.8 8.7 8.4 9.2 8.2 12.9 11.3 
 
10.0 10.5 8.7 9.5 
secondary 77.1 76.8 79.3 79.2 81.0 81.6 78.7 79.9 
 
79.0 78.5 83.0 79.5 
university 13.3 13.5 12.0 12.4 9.8 10.2 8.4 8.8 
 
11.0 11.0 8.4 11.0 
share of permanent 87.4 88.5 81.0 80.0 85.4 87.5 83.6 78.8 
 
67.9 73.9 69.4 60.9 
establishment size 
distribution              
E10_49 0.8 0.1 0.7 7.1 0.7 0.1 0.6 3.1 
 
20.8 10.4 17.6 33.0 
E50_249 10.6 7.3 22.0 36.8 8.3 4.7 15.4 18.9 
 
36.2 35.2 39.5 37.4 
E250 and more 88.7 92.6 77.2 56.1 91.0 95.3 84.0 78.1 
 
43.0 54.5 42.9 29.6 
Occupation Distribution 
             
Managers and 
Technicians 
26.2 26.2 26.2 25.8 24.9 25.6 21.0 23.8 
 
19.3 19.9 17.1 18.6 
Clerical Workers 1.3 1.2 2.1 2.5 1.7 1.3 1.3 3.3 
 
4.2 4.0 3.9 4.5 
Service Workers 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 
 
0.7 0.6 3.7 0.8 
Skilled manuals 67.6 67.7 66.7 67.5 68.7 68.9 72.9 66.5 
 
69.6 69.4 68.8 69.8 
Elementary occupations 3.9 3.8 4.5 3.9 4.0 3.5 4.3 5.9 
 
6.3 6.2 6.5 6.4 
Total of worker 
observations 
203725 175195 11421 17109 349324 251947 28649 68728 
 
94 706 53 143 1 411 40 152 
% of workers by type of 
coverage  
61.5 12.1 26.4 
 
43.0 11.3 45.7 
  
53.1 1.3 45.6 
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Table 2: Distribution of workers' characteristics by type of collective agreement (continued) 
 
Poland 
 
Hungary 
 
2004 
 
2002  2006 
Level of agreement 
coverage 
all firm industry no 
 
all firm industry no  all firm industry no 
 
[13] [14] [15] [16] 
 
[17] [18] [19] [20]  [21] [22] [23] [24] 
Age Distribution 
         
 
    
under 30 27.3 23.0 12.6 30.9 
 
26.42 24.44 22.8 27.69  21.5 16.76 18.13 23.94 
30 -39 28.9 27.7 19.3 30.1 
 
24.95 26.21 25.84 24.23  29.55 30.66 27.63 29.15 
40-49 23.5 26.3 26.9 21.3 
 
26.58 26.57 28.15 26.48  23.06 24.12 26.25 22.36 
0ver 50 20.3 23.0 41.2 17.7 
 
22.05 22.79 23.21 21.59  25.89 28.46 27.98 24.56 
Education Distribution 
         
 
    
primary 9.2 9.5 9.8 9.0 
 
14.71 14.64 16.05 14.66  12.69 9.42 12.18 14.27 
secondary 78.2 77.2 78.3 79.0 
 
72.31 69.68 66.17 74.1  71.9 71.64 65.54 72.41 
university 12.5 13.2 11.9 12.0 
 
12.98 15.69 17.78 11.24  15.41 18.94 22.28 13.32 
share of permanent 63.4 70.9 77.0 57.4 
 
93.41 94.2 96.13 92.82  94.93 96.28 96.8 94.18 
establishment size 
distribution          
 
    
E10_49 19.9 9.4 10.0 28.2 
 
39.4 11.72 19.42 55.06  19.69 4.3 6.56 27.76 
E50_249 37.3 34.5 14.8 40.0 
 
21.85 18.12 15.39 24.23  31.26 17.21 20.47 38.55 
E250 and more 42.8 56.1 75.3 31.8 
 
38.75 70.16 65.19 20.71  49.05 78.5 72.97 33.69 
Occupation Distribution 
         
 
    
Managers and 
Technicians 
21.0 22.0 22.2 20.1 
 
23.74 26.87 28.31 21.81  27.06 32.34 30.66 24.35 
Clerical Workers 4.2 4.0 4.7 4.4 
 
3.27 3.48 4.28 3.09  3.84 2.99 5.35 4.15 
Service Workers 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 
 
1.28 1.74 0.91 1.07  0.74 0.68 1.21 0.74 
Skilled manuals 67.7 67.8 67.3 67.7 
 
64.89 61.97 60.33 66.71  62.05 59.97 60.45 63.13 
Elementary 
occupations 
6.5 5.7 4.9 7.2 
 
6.82 5.94 6.17 7.32  6.3 4.02 2.33 7.62 
Total of worker 
observations 
102 298 48 895 1 108 52 295 
 
27 506 8944 1215 17347  28689 8823 1158 18708 
% of workers by type of 
coverage  
42.9 1.3 55.8 
  
36.3 5.9 57.8  
 
29.08 5.8 65.1 
Notes: male workers in the manufacturing sector. Sources: ESES 2002, 2006, Polish SES, 2004, 2006 
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Table 3: log monthly wages by type collective agreement 
           
 
Czech Republic 
 
Poland (Polish zloty) 
 
Hungary 
 
Mean 
log 
wage 
Standard 
deviation 
standardized 
mean log 
wage 
standardize
d standard 
deviation 
 
Mean log 
wage 
Standard 
deviation 
standardize
d mean log 
wage 
standardized 
standard 
deviation 
 
Mean 
log 
wage 
Standard 
deviation 
standardize
d mean log 
wage 
standardiz
ed 
standard 
deviation 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
 
[9] [10] [11] [12] 
 
[13] [14] [15] [16] 
               
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2002 
firm level agreement 9.748 0.409 9.791 0.409 
 
7.484 0.548 7.592 0.594 
 
11.732 0.577 11.816 0.568 
industry level 
agreement 
9.697 0.425 9.638 0.439 
 
7.586 0.524 7.753 0.501 
 
11.717 0.595 11.953 0.600 
no agreement 9.740 0.480 9.653 0.437 
 
7.450 0.560 7.384 0.561 
 
11.408 0.540 11.281 0.496 
      
 
2006 
 
2006 
 
2006 
firm level agreement 9.942 0.415 9.971 0.404 
 
7.741 0.540 7.872 0.512 
 
12.187 0.586 12.256 0.563 
industry level 
agreement 
9.870 0.436 9.772 0.455 
 
7.918 0.438 8.008 0.318 
 
12.238 0.621 12.451 0.598 
no agreement 9.883 0.459 9.835 0.479 
 
7.581 0.561 7.509 0.573 
 
11.778 0.596 11.579 0.543 
               
Notes: Male workers in the manufacturing sector. Standardized mean and standard deviations are obtained using the technique from Di Nardo et al. (1996). Sources: ESES 2002, 2006, Polish SES. 
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Table 4 - Collective Bargaining and average wages of men in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (2002, 2006) 
 
2002
a
 
 
2006 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
 
[4] [5] [6] 
 
Czech Republic 
firm level agreement 0.035 --0.030 --0.014 
 
0.097*** --0.024 --0.011 
 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.025) 
 
(0.026) (0.017) (0.017) 
industry level agreement 0.034 0.028 0.019 
 
0.043 0.044 0.042 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.033) 
 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.029) 
R squared 0.00 0.39 0.40 
 
0.01 0.40 0.41 
Observations 203725 203725 203725 
 
349324 349324 349324 
 
Poland 
firm level agreement 0.163*** 0.008 0.011 
 
0.160*** 0.022 0.026 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.021) (0.016) (0.016) 
industry level agreement 0.082 --0.080* 0.074 
 
0.337*** 0.112*** 0.129*** 
 
(0.054) (0.046) (0.047) 
 
(0.073) (0.038) (0.039) 
R squared 0.02 0.44 0.45 
 
0.02 0.42 0.43 
Observations 111215 111215 111215 
 
102298 102298 102298 
 
Hungary 
firm level agreement 0.273*** 0.061** 0.062** 
 
0.318*** 0.129*** 0.127*** 
 
(0.031) (0.025) (0.024) 
 
(0.047) (0.036) (0.036) 
industry level agreement 0.317*** 0.055 0.057 
 
0.436*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
 
(0.085) (0.036) (0.036) 
 
(0.091) (0.039) (0.039) 
R squared 0.06 0.47 0.47 
 
0.07 0.46 0.46 
Observations 27506 27506 27506 
 
28689 28689 28689 
Notes: in columns [2], [5] we control for individual characteristics (age, education, type of contract, occupation), firm size and its nace section. In columns [3], 
[6] we also control for the characteristics of coworkers (share of female coworkers, coworkers university degree, under 30 and over 50 years old). Estimated 
coefficients for the full set of controls are reported in Table A1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance levels: * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. a 2004 for Poland 
 
26 
 
Table 5: Collective bargaining and average wages, after controlling for firm age (by sector and size) 
  2002  2006 
  [1] [2] [3]  [4] [5] [6] 
  Czech Republic 
Firm level agreement --0.022 --0.022 --0.020 
 
--0.002 --0.012 0.006 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Industry level agreement 0.019 0.013 0.011 
 
0.037 0.044 0.048* 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.028) 
  Poland 
Firm level agreement 0.01 0.011 0.011 
 
0.029* 0.024 0.030* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Industry level agreement 0.074 0.076 0.074 
 
0.152*** 0.137*** 0.143*** 
 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 
 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
  Hungary 
Firm level agreement 0.059** 0.061** 0.065** 
 
0.117*** 0.088** 0.105*** 
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.041) 
Industry level agreement 0.058 0.034 0.061 
 
0.154*** 0.111** 0.157*** 
 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.038) 
 
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) 
Notes: OLS regressions. Specifications in columns [1], [4] include controls for firm age, age^2 , age^3 . Specifications in column [2], [5] include interactions 
between firm age and NACE. Specifications in columns [3], [6] include interactions between firm age and firm size. All specifications include individual 
characteristics, firm sector, size and characteristics of coworkers. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance levels: 
*** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% 
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Table 6 - Oaxaca decomposition of predicted wage differentials and the wage premium of collective agreements between 2002a and 2006 
  Czech Republic Poland Hungary 
 Coefs. (Std. Err.) Coefs. (Std. Err.) Coefs. (Std. Err.) 
Predicted Wage differential 2006-2002 0.157*** (0.013) 0.107*** 0.013352 0.368*** (0.023) 
       
Endowments --0.014* (0.008) 0.016 (0.013) 0.081*** (0.016) 
of which firm level agreement 0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.002) --0.004* (0.002) 
of which industry level agreement --0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
  
      
Coefficients 0.176*** (0.010) 0.149*** (0.012) 0.283*** (0.015) 
of which firm level agreement 0.002 (0.018) 0.008 -0.012 0.024 (0.016) 
of which industry level agreement 0.002 (0.004) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.006** (0.003) 
  
      
Interaction --0.005 (0.008) --0.026** (0.010) 0.003 (0.006) 
of which firm level agreement --0.001 (0.006) 0.002 (0.003) --0.004 0.000 
of which industry level agreement --0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 553049 213513 56195 
Notes: All specifications include individual characteristics, firm sector size and characteristics of coworkers. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level 
in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% 
a
 2004 for Poland 
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Table 7: heterogeneous effects of collective bargaining along the wage distribution 
    
 
2002
a
 
 
2006 
 
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
 
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
 
Czech Republic 
Firm level agreement 0.017 0.002 0.004 0.027 --0.063* 
 
0.038* 0.009 0.009 0.022 --0.060** 
 
(0.032) (0.024) (0.027) (0.03) (0.035) 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.02) (0.026) (0.029) 
Industry level agreement 0.025 0.034 0.047 0.022 0.019 
 
0.048 0.054 0.034 0.029 0.003 
 
(0.04) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038) (0.042) 
 
(0.041) (0.033) (0.031) (0.038) (0.034) 
R squared 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.4 0.39 
 
0.36 0.39 0.4 0.41 0.39 
Observations 203725 
 
349324 
 
Poland 
Firm level agreement 0.033** 0.025 0.019 0.012 0.004 
 
0.043** 0.036* 0.018 0.02 0.028 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.02) (0.019) 
Industry level agreement 0.034 0.061 0.061 0.075 0.079 
 
0.284** 0.219*** 0.159*** 0.088* 0.015 
 
(0.041) (0.062) (0.049) (0.056) (0.053) 
 
(0.115) (0.04) (0.036) (0.05) (0.058) 
R squared 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.42 
 
0.4 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.41 
Observations 111215 
 
102298 
 
Hungary 
Firm level agreement 0.088*** 0.068*** 0.069** 0.048* 0.024 
 
0.156*** 0.132*** 0.128*** 0.107** 0.071** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.03) 
 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.047) (0.035) 
Industry level agreement 0.155*** 0.098*** 0.091** 0.031 0.006 
 
0.279*** 0.238*** 0.194*** 0.156*** 0.116** 
 
(0.039) (0.034) (0.042) (0.04) (0.069) 
 
(0.088) (0.044) (0.037) (0.049) (0.057) 
R squared 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.45 
 
0.42 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.44 
Observations 27506 
 
 
28689 
Notes: Conditional quintile regressions. All specifications include individual characteristics, firm sector size and characteristics of coworkers. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
firm level in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% 
a
 2004 for Poland 
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Table 8: heterogeneous effects of collective bargaining across age groups  
 
2002 
 
2006 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
 
[4] [5] [6] 
 
under 30 30 - 50 over 50 
 
under 30 30 - 50 over 50 
 
Czech Republic 
Firm level agreement --0.003 --0.014 --0.016 
 
0.001 --0.026 0.007 
 
(0.026) (0.029) (0.026) 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) 
Industry level agreement 0.078** 0.006 --0.012 
 
0.058 0.033 0.043 
 
(0.039) (0.035) (0.035) 
 
(0.035) (0.029) (0.034) 
R squared 0.29 0.42 0.41 
 
0.33 0.42 0.42 
Observations 51632 95636 56457 
 
89419 169611 90294 
 
Poland 
Firm level agreement 0.005 0.013 0.016 
 
0.001 0.032* 0.035** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) 
 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.018) 
Industry level agreement 0.077 --0.080* 0.068 
 
0.019 0.136*** 0.142*** 
 
(0.067) (0.048) (0.046) 
 
(0.073) (0.044) (0.04) 
R squared 0.36 0.43 0.46 
 
0.34 0.45 0.44 
Observations 306317 635352 205631 
 
327216 628690 243573 
 
Hungary 
Firm level agreement 0.070** 0.042 0.087*** 
 
0.098*** 0.158*** 0.086*** 
 
(0.034) (0.026) (0.025) 
 
(0.037) (0.041) (0.032) 
Industry level agreement 0.019 0.055 0.087* 
 
0.135*** 0.197*** 0.202*** 
 
(0.040) (0.038) (0.049) 
 
(0.038) (0.047) (0.048) 
R squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 
 
0.46 0.47 0.44 
Observations 7267 14174 6065 
 
6167 15093 7429 
Notes: OLS regressions by agre group. All specifications include individual characteristics, firm sector size and characteristics of coworkers. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the firm level in parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% 
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Table A1 - Individual worker characteristics and average wages in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (p1)(2002, 2006)     
  Czech Republic  Poland 
 
2002 2006  2004 
2002  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]  [7] [8] [9] 
education (secondary)  
 
0.111*** 0.109*** 
 
0.097*** 0.088***   0.414*** 0.361*** 
 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.013) (0.012)   (0.012) (0.011) 
education (tertiary) 
 
0.425*** 0.395*** 
 
0.420*** 0.386***   0.069*** 0.069*** 
 
 
(0.018) (0.015) 
 
(0.020) (0.017)   (0.007) (0.007) 
age (under 30) 
 
--0.124*** --0.129*** 
 
--0.144*** --0.141***   --0.130*** --0.129*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.005) 
 
(0.009) (0.007)   (0.006) (0.005) 
age (40-50) 
 
--0.005 0.002 
 
--0.013* --0.006   0.030*** 0.031*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.008) (0.008)   (0.005) (0.005) 
age (over 50) 
 
--0.022*** 0.004 
 
--0.041*** --0.003   0.062*** 0.068*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.006) 
 
(0.010) (0.008)   (0.007) (0.006) 
fixed-term contract 
 
--0.055*** --0.053*** 
 
--0.159*** --0.153***   --0.185*** --0.182*** 
 
 
(0.020) (0.020) 
 
(0.014) (0.014)   (0.01) (0.009) 
occupation (managers, 
professionals, technical workers) 
 0.590*** 0.503*** 
 
0.593*** 0.521***   0.556*** 0.444*** 
 
 
(0.015) (0.033) 
 
(0.032) (0.037)   (0.015) (0.023) 
occupation (clerks) 
 
0.299*** 0.265*** 
 
0.276*** 0.251***   0.215*** 0.190*** 
 
 
(0.026) (0.029) 
 
(0.048) (0.046)   (0.014) (0.015) 
occupation (service workers) 
 
0.092* 0.079* 
 
0.201** 0.179**   0.093*** 0.065** 
 
 
(0.049) (0.045) 
 
(0.097) (0.085)   (0.034) (0.032) 
occupation (skilled manuals) 
 
0.246*** 0.204*** 
 
0.232*** 0.200***   0.184*** 0.168*** 
 
 
(0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.031) (0.028)   (0.012) (0.012) 
average characteristics of coworkers in the same firm and occupational group     
share with university degree 
  
0.206** 
  
0.188**    0.326*** 
 
  
(0.085) 
  
(0.078)    (0.043) 
share of under 30 
  
0.033 
  
--0.103    0.003 
 
  
(0.090) 
  
(0.066)    (0.031) 
share  of over 50 
  
--0.266*** 
  
--0.341***    0.036 
 
  
(0.073) 
  
(0.067)    (0.056) 
share  of female 
  
--0.156*** 
  
--0.095**    --0.165*** 
 
  
(0.037) 
  
(0.039)    (0.026) 
constant 9.678*** 9.215*** 9.378*** 9.813*** 9.360*** 9.554***  7.454*** 7.305*** 7.364*** 
 
(0.021) (0.044) (0.061) (0.019) (0.045) (0.059)  (0.012) (0.026) (0.03) 
NACE dummies (2 digit) no yes yes no yes yes  no yes yes 
firm size dummies no yes yes no yes yes  no yes yes 
Observations 203725 203725 203725 349324 349324 349324  111215 111215 111215 
  
31 
Table A1 - Individual worker characteristics and average wages in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary (2002, 2006) (continued) 
  Poland Hungary 
 
2006 2002 2006 
2002  [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 
education (secondary)  
 
0.395*** 0.330*** 
 
0.140*** 0.137***  0.141*** 0.137*** 
  
(0.014) (0.011) 
 
(0.011) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.014) 
education (tertiary) 
 
0.054*** 0.053*** 
 
0.540*** 0.488***  0.569*** 0.478*** 
  
(0.008) (0.007) 
 
(0.022) (0.022)  (0.024) (0.025) 
age (under 30) 
 
--0.126*** --0.118*** 
 
--0.106*** --0.113***  --0.150*** --0.135*** 
  
(0.006) (0.005) 
 
(0.008) (0.007)  (0.012) (0.010) 
age (40-50) 
 
0.015** 0.021*** 
 
--0.010 --0.008  0.010 0.010 
  
(0.006) (0.005) 
 
(0.010) (0.009)  (0.015) (0.014) 
age (over 50) 
 
0.016** 0.047*** 
 
0.013 0.030***  0.006 0.024** 
  
(0.008) (0.005) 
 
(0.012) (0.009)  (0.016) (0.011) 
fixed-term contract 
 
--0.185*** --0.180*** 
 
--0.123*** --0.122***  --0.144*** --0.141*** 
  
(0.011) (0.01) 
 
(0.019) (0.019)  (0.025) (0.025) 
occupation (managers, 
professionals, technical workers) 
 0.530*** 0.385*** 
 
0.538*** 0.506***  0.535*** 0.454*** 
  
(0.016) (0.024) 
 
(0.019) (0.025)  (0.025) (0.032) 
occupation (clerks) 
 
0.168*** 0.120*** 
 
0.194*** 0.195***  0.196*** 0.181*** 
  
(0.017) (0.018) 
 
(0.023) (0.023)  (0.027) (0.027) 
occupation (service workers) 
 
0.078** 0.039 
 
0.001 --0.007  --0.006 --0.015 
  
(0.037) (0.036) 
 
(0.035) (0.035)  (0.038) (0.039) 
occupation (skilled manuals) 
 
0.169*** 0.144*** 
 
0.156*** 0.157***  0.174*** 0.173*** 
  
(0.014) (0.015) 
 
(0.015) (0.015)  (0.020) (0.020) 
average characteristics of coworkers in the same firm and occupational group    
share with university degree 
  
0.386*** 
  
0.142***   0.268*** 
   
(0.043) 
  
(0.045)   (0.052) 
share of under 30 
  
--0.096** 
  
0.028   --0.070* 
   
(0.041) 
  
(0.029)   (0.037) 
share  of over 50 
  
--0.186*** 
  
--0.051*   --0.077** 
   
(0.037) 
  
(0.027)   (0.038) 
share  of female 
  
--0.199*** 
  
--0.061*   --0.058 
   
(0.03) 
  
(0.032)   (0.038) 
constant 7.581*** 7.501*** 7.614*** 11.425*** 11.148*** 11.176*** 11.790*** 11.405*** 11.457*** 
 
(0.013) (0.03) (0.035) (0.014) (0.042) (0.044) (0.017) (0.086) (0.093) 
NACE dummies (2 digit) no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes 
firm size dummies no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes 
Observations 102298 102298 102298 27506 27506 27506 28689 28689 28689 
Notes: Estimated coefficients of the main control variables used for estimates reported in Table 4, columns [1]-[6]. Reference category: male worker, with age 30-39, 
primary education employed with long-term contract in unskilled occupation for a firm with more than 250 employees in the manufacture of food products, beverages 
and tobacco. Significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; *10% 
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Table A2 - Individual worker characteristics and 2002-2006 wage differentials in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary 
  Czech Republic Poland Hungary 
  Coefs. (Std. Err.) Coefs. (Std. Err.) Coefs. (Std. Err.) 
Predicted wage 2006 9.861*** (0.012) 7.654*** (0.001) 11.910*** (0.019) 
Predicted wage 2002 9.704*** (0.012) 7.547*** (0.008) 11.542*** (0.014) 
Predicted Wage differential 2006-2002 0.157*** (0.013) 0.107*** (0.013) 0.368*** (0.023) 
Endowments: --0.014* (0.008) 0.016 -0.013 0.081*** (0.016) 
education (secondary)  0.004*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
education (tertiary) --0.013*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 0.011*** (0.003) 
age (under 30) --0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
age (40-50) --0.000 (0.000) --0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
age (over 50) --0.000 (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 
fixed-term contract 0.000 (0.001) --0.013*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
managers, professionals, technical workers --0.007* (0.004) 0.005** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.004) 
occupation (clerks) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001*** (0.001) 
occupation (service workers) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
occupation (skilled manuals) 0.003 (0.002) --0.003*** (0.001) --0.004*** (0.002) 
share with university degree --0.005** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 
share of under 30 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) --0.001 (0.001) 
share  of over 50 0.005** (0.002) 0.005 (0.008) --0.002* (0.001) 
share  of female 0.007*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Coefficients: 0.176*** (0.010) 0.149*** (0.012) 0.283*** (0.015) 
education (secondary)  --0.016 (0.012) --0.003** (0.002) 0.000 (0.013) 
education (tertiary) --0.001 (0.003) --0.013* (0.008) --0.001 (0.003) 
age (under 30) --0.003 (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) --0.006* (0.003) 
age (40-50) --0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.005 (0.005) 
age (over 50) --0.002 (0.003) --0.004*** (0.002) --0.001 (0.003) 
fixed-term contract --0.015*** (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) --0.001 (0.002) 
managers, professionals, technical workers 0.005 (0.013) --0.012* (0.007) --0.009 (0.007) 
occupation (clerks) --0.000 (0.001) --0.003*** (0.001) --0.000 (0.001) 
occupation (service workers) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) --0.000 (0.001) 
occupation (skilled manuals) --0.002 (0.020) 0.017 (0.013) 0.011 (0.018) 
share with university degree --0.002 (0.012) 0.006 (0.007) 0.012* (0.006) 
share of under 30  --0.029 (0.023) --0.024* (0.013) --0.025** (0.012) 
share  of over 50 --0.022 (0.027) --0.007** (0.003) --0.005 (0.010) 
share  of females 0.017 (0.014) 0.007 (0.008) 0.001 (0.010) 
constant 0.176** (0.080) 0.250*** (0.045) 0.280*** (0.103) 
Interaction: --0.005 (0.008) --0.026** (0.011) 0.003 (0.006) 
education (secondary)  --0.001 (0.001) --0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
education (tertiary) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) --0.000 (0.001) 
age (under 30) --0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001* (0.001) 
age (40-50) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) --0.001 (0.001) 
age (over 50) 0.000 (0.000) --0.001** (0.000) --0.000 (0.001) 
fixed-term contract 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
managers, professionals, technical workers --0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) --0.002 (0.001) 
occupation (clerks) --0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) --0.000 (0.000) 
occupation (service workers) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
occupation (skilled manuals) --0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) --0.000 (0.001) 
share with university degree 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.000) 0.003* (0.002) 
share of under 30 --0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.000) 0.004** (0.002) 
share  of over 50 0.001 (0.002) --0.022** (0.000) --0.001 (0.002) 
share  of females --0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) --0.000 (0.000) 
Observations 553049 213513 56195 
Notes: All specifications also include dummies for firm sector and size (not reported). Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% 
 
